Still Tenser, Said the Censor.

Stay classy, YCombinator.

The Care and Feeding of the Sage SmartProbe.

If you cured your Sage SmartProbe of its congenital disease as per the last article on the subject, you may now be wondering what to do with it.

The vendor supplied a massive Java shitware with the thing, which does not merit any discussion whatsoever. Instead, we will use the probe’s very spiffy GDB-compatible interface. Configure your GDB as follows:

gdbinit.txt:

### log all instructions
set logging on
set logging file gdb_out.txt
 
### only if you want to see the raw gdb packets...
#set debug remote 1
 
### if you're debugging the BIOS
set architecture i386
 
### if you are debugging a warmed-up OS
# set architecture i386:x86-64
 
### where the probe is:
target remote /dev/ttyACM0
 
### or, if it is connected to your LAN,
### let's say at 192.168.1.111,
# target remote 192.168.1.111:2159
 
# Show instructions on single-step
set disassemble-next-line on
 
# Disable evil, heretical GAS syntax
#set disassembly-flavor intel
 
### if you want the ncurses gui in gdb
# layout asm

So, for instance, let’s connect to a freshly-booted AMD G-series box spinning in Coreboot’s boot selector menu,

$ gdb --command=gdbinit.txt
GNU gdb (Gentoo 7.8.1 vanilla) 7.8.1
Copyright (C) 2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.  Type "show copying"
and "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "x86_64-pc-linux-gnu".
Type "show configuration" for configuration details.
For bug reporting instructions, please see:
.
Find the GDB manual and other documentation resources online at:
.
For help, type "help".
Type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word".
The target architecture is assumed to be i386
(gdb) si
0x001015ae in ?? ()
=> 0x001015ae:  c3      ret
(gdb)
0x001035a9 in ?? ()
=> 0x001035a9:  29 f0   sub    %esi,%eax
(gdb)
0x001035ab in ?? ()
=> 0x001035ab:  19 fa   sbb    %edi,%edx
(gdb)
0x001035ad in ?? ()
=> 0x001035ad:  39 ea   cmp    %ebp,%edx
(gdb)
0x001035af in ?? ()
=> 0x001035af:  72 f3   jb     0x1035a4
(gdb)
0x001035b1 in ?? ()
=> 0x001035b1:  77 04   ja     0x1035b7
(gdb)
0x001035b3 in ?? ()
=> 0x001035b3:  39 d8   cmp    %ebx,%eax
(gdb)
0x001035b5 in ?? ()
=> 0x001035b5:  72 ed   jb     0x1035a4
(gdb)
0x001035b7 in ?? ()
=> 0x001035b7:  83 c4 0c        add    $0xc,%esp
(gdb)
0x001035ba in ?? ()
=> 0x001035ba:  5b      pop    %ebx
(gdb) c
Continuing.
^C
Program received signal SIGTRAP, Trace/breakpoint trap.
0x001035b5 in ?? ()
=> 0x001035b5:  72 ed   jb     0x1035a4
(gdb) q
A debugging session is active.
 
        Inferior 1 [Remote target] will be killed.
 
Quit anyway? (y or n) y

I will add that the probe also works great with IDA Pro’s GDB interface. Or whatever other, similar front-end you might fancy.

But! In order to make proper use of the probe, you will need the vendor-specific command set for manipulating the DC power, PCI bus, JTAG chain, and so forth. These were at one point published on the vendor’s site, which has vanished without a trace. I have made a cleaned-up HTML version:

Sage Smartprobe GDB Command Manual.

Note that I have discovered certain undocumented commands. These will be the subject of a later article!

How to Make Your Own Lamport Parachute from Common Household Materials.

The thought began, as many good things begin, in #trilema.

Users of the WOT, of V, and other systems where your cryptographic identity is wholly in your own hands1 live with a certain risk of “cryptographic death” – i.e. the compromise of one’s signing key. A conscientious user of public key crypto might keep the thought of this calamity somewhere in the back of his head, filed right next to “piano falling on my head” and other misfortunes from which there can be no return.

A correctly-generated RSA key is unlikely to be broken via cryptoanalytic means within the owner’s lifetime. But “never say never!” And there is always the possibility of a mass slaughter of keys, a “cryptocalypse”, where the public key cryptosystem of your choice is broken (or, via whatever mathematical advances, weakens, and the cost of deriving your private key from your public key becomes tractably low.)

The popular notion of key revocation is a questionable business because it attempts to impose a political structure onto an uncooperative mathematical reality — in the jargon of #trilema, it is “promisetronic, not protocolic.” Someone who takes possession of your signing key can walk around and befoul your reputation, ‘Who steals my purse steals trash; ’tis something, nothing; ‘Twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave to thousands; But he that filches from me my good name…’ without regard to time or space – he can sign whatever he likes and attribute it to you. And those who have not received your revocation signal will accept the forgeries as the genuine article. Nothing whatsoever can be done to rescue a compromised signing key. But might it be possible to rescue its owner from WOT death by establishing an unforgeable continuity of identity ?

The answer is: “possibly.” The Bitcoin blockchain2 gives us a very strong mechanism for cryptographic timestamping3 – i.e. the act of certifying, to a skeptical observer, that some particular string of bits had indeed been in existence at a particular point in time. The current state-of-the-art implementation of this concept is called Deedbot, and the reader is invited to become familiar with it. If you make an arrangement with your associates in advance that a certain public key Deedbotted at a certain time is to be regarded as your emergency fallback, you have a kind of “parachute” on which you may conceivably float safely to the ground in the event of your plane’s wings, if you will, breaking off — i.e. a signing key compromise.4

However, the obvious caveat is that the “parachute” keypair must exist at the time of the Deedbotting, and its public key must be, well, public. This can be a problem in the scenario where the cryptosystem itself- e.g., RSA – is publicly broken. The enemy can now do as he pleases with your primary and fallback keys, and you – the cryptographic you – have died a permanent death. And all known public key signature schemes rely on unproven5 number-theoretic conjectures, and may conceivably fall this very night. All except for one…

L. Lamport’s 1979 “one time signature” algorithm rests on no number-theoretic conjecture, but merely on the strength of a collision-resistant hash of the operator’s choosing. On account of certain disadvantages which will soon become apparent to the reader, it is used virtually nowhere. But it so happens that it is entirely perfect for our “parachute” scenario.

A complete and usable implementation of this “Lamport parachute” is presented in this article. It is written in 68 69 lines of Bash and makes use strictly of commonplace userland utilities, such as may be met with on a typical Linux box. This somewhat strange choice of implementation language (it certainly does not shine, for instance, speedwise) is deliberate: the user is expected to understand each individual part, so that the function of the whole becomes unambiguously apparent, like 2+2. As the field of cryptography is slowly reconquered from the Schneiers and other scumbags presently maggoting on top of it, expect this type of didactic presentation to become ordinary practice.

A Lamport public key consists of two lists, let’s call them A and B, of randomly-generated bitstrings that have been hashed with a collision-resistant hash and thereafter published. To make use of such a key, the owner hashes the payload being signed, and for each bit that is equal to 0 in the resulting hash, reveals the original pre-hash string from column A, whereas if it is equal to 1 he reveals a pre-hash string from column B. For reasons which I hope are quite obvious to the alert reader, a Lamport public key is to be made use of only once. And such a key is quite bulky, as is the signature resulting from its use.6

But enough words! It is time for the deeds!

We shall generate7 our Lamport Parachute like this:

lamport_mkpriv.sh

#!/bin/bash
 
if [ $# -lt 2 ]
then
  echo "Usage: ./`basename $0` PAYLOADBITS STRENGTHBITS"
  exit 1
fi
 
for i in $(seq 1 $(($1 * 2))) ; do
    echo `od -N $(($2 / 8)) -An -t x1 -v /dev/random | tr -d " \n"` ;
done | xargs -n 2

All this does is to give us two columns of STRENGTHBITS-sized random integers, times PAYLOADBITS rows.

Specifically:

$ ./lamport_mkpriv.sh 256 512 > privkey.txt

This will create a parachute private key suitable for use with sha256 – i.e. it is able to sign a 256-bit payload. The strength – or length of the random strings – in this example is 512 bits. It is pointlessly suicidal to use a strength value below the output length of your chosen hash algorithm, but otherwise the choice is unconstrained, so long as it byte-aligns.8

Now we would like to generate the corresponding public key:

lamport_priv2pub.sh

#!/bin/bash
 
if [ $# -lt 1 ]
then
  echo "Usage: ./`basename $0` HASHUTIL < PRIVKEY.TXT > PUBKEY.TXT"
  exit 1
fi
 
for x in $(cat) ; do
    echo -n $x | xxd -r -p | $1 | cut -d ' ' -f1 ;
done | xargs -n 2

We simply apply the HASHUTIL of choice to the bitstrings produced by lamport_mkpriv.sh.

And it is done like this:

$ ./lamport_priv2pub.sh sha256sum < privkey.txt > pubkey.txt

Now we have the public key.

If you are generating a “battlefield”9 key, it is now time to consider its intended usage scenario. If the payload of the signature is known in advance – e.g., a “warrant canary”, or some other such thing – you will generate its signature immediately, and the private key may then be destroyed immediately.10

Otherwise the private key is to be retained, shielded stegatronically from prying eyes, and hidden safely far away from your usual places of business or habitation, or other locations liable to be searched by the enemy.

Let’s make a second public/private keypair of the same type:

$ ./lamport_mkpriv.sh 256 512 > another_privkey.txt
$ ./lamport_priv2pub.sh sha256sum < another_privkey.txt > another_pubkey.txt

And now we should like to make use of our Lamport Parachute.

Let’s sign a message:

lamport_encode.sh

#!/bin/bash
 
if [ $# -lt 1 ]
then
  echo "Usage: ./`basename $0` PRIVKEY.TXT < HEXPAYLOAD > ENCODED.TXT"
  exit 1
fi
 
payload=$(cat | tr '[:lower:]' '[:upper:]')
len=$((${#payload} * 4))
bits=$(printf "%*s" $len $(echo "ibase=16;obase=2;$payload" | bc | tr -d '\\\n') | tr ' ' 0)
 
while IFS= read -r p; do
    bit=${bits:0:1};
    bits=${bits:1};
    echo $p | cut -d ' ' -f$(($bit + 1));
done < "$1"

Here we simply iterate over the bits of the payload, choosing the unhashed original private strings from column A or B as discussed earlier.

Remember, we generated a private key that can carry a 256-bit payload. It does not necessarily have to be a hash, but in this example we will take one, e.g.:

$ echo "Attack at dawn." | sha256sum | cut -d ' ' -f1
 
1d6c270d7cc7e82a816ffb7bc3797d213b24d9d17af48f4b3b8d01fb43ed15c3
 
echo "Attack at dawn." | sha256sum | cut -d ' ' -f1 | ./lamport_encode.sh privkey.txt > encoded.txt

And we get a signature.

NOW YOU MUST DESTROY THE PRIVATE KEY! IT SHALL NEVER BE USED AGAIN!

Quite analogously to a Vernam "One Time Pad" -- the re-use of a Lamport private key is cryptographically suicidal.

And now some counterparty, with whom you have taken care to share your parachute's public key, wishes to verify the signature. It happens like this:

lamport_decode.sh

#!/bin/bash
 
if [ $# -lt 2 ]
then
  echo "Usage: ./`basename $0` HASHUTIL PUBKEY.TXT < ENCODED.TXT > HEXPAYLOAD"
  exit 1
fi
 
bits=""
while read -u 3 pkl; do
    if ! read el
    then
        break
    fi
    bits="$bits$(
        case $(echo -n $el | xxd -r -p | $1 | cut -d ' ' -f1) in
            $(echo $pkl | cut -d ' ' -f1)) echo "0" ;;
            $(echo $pkl | cut -d ' ' -f2)) echo "1" ;;
            *) exit 1; break ;;
            esac)"
    if [[ $? == 1 ]]
    then
        echo False >&amp;2;
        exit 1
    fi
done 3< $2
 
padlen=$(od -N 1 /dev/zero | $1 | cut -d ' ' -f1 | tr -d " \n" | wc -c)
printf "%*s\n" $padlen $(echo "ibase=2;obase=10000;$bits" | bc  | tr -d '\\\n' | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]') | tr ' ' 0

Here we simply take each bitstring from an encoded parachute message (the signature) -- hash it with the pre-agreed hashing algo; and determine which column of each respective row of the public key the result is found in. (If the answer is "neither", the decoder terminates and warns us.)

So, for instance:

$ ./lamport_decode.sh sha256sum pubkey.txt < encoded.txt
 
1d6c270d7cc7e82a816ffb7bc3797d213b24d9d17af48f4b3b8d01fb43ed15c3

We have decoded a payload. If we had agreed, in advance, that this payload is the sha256 hash of a document, e.g.:

$ diff < (./lamport_decode.sh sha256sum pubkey.txt < encoded.txt) <(echo "Attack at dawn." | sha256sum | cut -d ' ' -f1)

We are able to verify it.

Now let's try the same, but with the wrong public key:

$ diff < (./lamport_decode.sh sha256sum another_pubkey.txt < encoded.txt) <(echo "Attack at dawn." | sha256sum | cut -d ' ' -f1)
 
False
0a1
> 1d6c270d7cc7e82a816ffb7bc3797d213b24d9d17af48f4b3b8d01fb43ed15c3

Observe that it is possible to make use of any hashing algorithm11 you may happen to like, so long as you have it available as a command-line program.


Epilogue.

A V-genesis for these didactic examples is available12 here; Seal - here..



  1. As opposed to... the other kind. Where your self-appointed masters could impersonate you at their leisure if they so choose. 
  2. There exists, and can exist, precisely one blockchain.
  3. All other cryptographic timestamp schemes currently known rely on a "trusted third party." And a sane user trusts "third parties" no further than he can throw them! 
  4. If it so happens that you learn of your private key having been compromised before the consequences become irreparably grave, you should consider yourself extraordinarily lucky. Just ask, e.g., Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. 
  5. The "hardness" -- i.e. the amount of computation required to break an RSA key, of whatever length, is unknown. And if your university professor taught you that it is known, or -- more egregiously -- that "it is equivalent to integer-factoring", then he is not merely an ignoramus but a particular kind of liar
  6. There exist certain questionable schemes to somewhat reduce this bulk, but I have deliberately eschewed them in light of the gravity of the task at hand. Good men may well die from your "reasonable" optimizations, your "negligible" losses of strength, loathesome hucksters
  7. Chances are that Lamport key generation, being an entropy-hungry affair, will take an unacceptably long time on your box. The temptation to replace "/dev/random" with "/dev/urandom" will be great. Needless to say that if the key is being generated for battlefield use, such a substitution is impermissible. But if you are following along simply for study, go ahead. Just remember to switch it back before crafting that missile launch key... 
  8. I.e. a multiple of 8. 
  9. I.e. for use in practice. 
  10. Along, if your situation is sufficiently grave to merit this, you will also cremate the very machine used in these operations! 
  11. One interesting tidbit is that public key signatures are only possible if trapdoor functions exist -- see Rompel, 1990. So, today, or 100 years from now, you're stuck choosing a hash algo. 
  12. Strictly under Popescu's License

Phuctored SSH Public Keys.

Phuctored SSH Public Keys to date.

Keys were obtained from a scan of the complete IPv4 space. We have gone approximately 20% of the way through the data set at the time of this writing.

Click on the IP addresses to view a key in Phuctor, or on the SSH hello string to view pertinent discussions.

A snapshot of ALL Phuctored keys at the time of writing can be viewed here, if the main site is slow under load.

(Feel free to ask questions !)


IP SSH Hello SSL Hello

112.16.4.21

SSH-1.99-Comware-5.20

112.16.65.245

112.16.65.247

112.16.95.66

SSH-1.99-RGOS_SSH_1.0

177.234.0.97

SSH-1.99-HUAWEI-1.5

177.234.11.229

SSH-1.99-HUAWEI-1.5

177.234.13.179

SSH-1.99-DOPRA-1.5

177.234.13.241

SSH-1.99-HUAWEI-1.5

177.234.15.27

177.234.1.73

SSH-1.99-HUAWEI-1.5

177.234.1.91

SSH-1.99-DOPRA-1.5

177.234.4.97

SSH-1.99-HUAWEI-1.5

177.234.6.21

SSH-1.99-HUAWEI-1.5

177.234.9.13

SSH-1.99-HUAWEI-1.5

183.246.69.24

SSH-1.99-Comware-5.20

187.188.126.28

187.72.155.221

SSH-2.0-AudioCodes
subject=/CN=ACL_3353352

187.72.216.78

SSH-2.0-AudioCodes
subject=/CN=ACL_3353177

189.112.138.254

189.203.181.149

SSH-1.99-DOPRA-1.5

189.203.181.7

SSH-1.99-DOPRA-1.5

189.203.72.147

SSH-1.99-DOPRA-1.5

190.39.56.107

197.221.61.38

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_3.8.1p1 Debian-8.sarge.4

197.221.63.150

200.146.242.241

SSH-2.0-AudioCodes
subject=/CN=ACL_3348823

201.101.37.44

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_6.0p1 Debian-4+deb7u2

201.16.189.38

201.249.207.150

SSH-1.99-HUAWEI-1.5
subject=/name=AR157-Self-Signed-Certificate-210235384810E4001320

202.166.221.118

2.116.209.1

SSH-1.99-DOPRA-1.5

217.57.196.177

SSH-1.99-DOPRA-1.5

217.57.196.179

SSH-1.99-DOPRA-1.5

223.94.78.217

SSH-1.99-Comware-5.20

59.21.182.242

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.9
subject=/C=US/ST=California/L=Sunnyvale/O=Aerohive/OU=Default/CN=HiveAP

66.233.213.117

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.2

68.14.242.210

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_6.6
subject=/C=US/ST=Florida/L=Orlando/O=Creative Manager – AZ Office/CN=gnatbox.creative-manager.com/emailAddress=support@iccsllc.com

71.39.252.162

74.45.0.60

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_4.1
subject=/C=US/ST=California/L=Sunnyvale/O=Tropos Networks/OU=Manufacturing/CN=Tropos Router/emailAddress=support@tropos.com

74.45.228.159

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.2
subject=/C=US/ST=California/L=Sunnyvale/O=Tropos Networks/OU=Manufacturing/CN=Tropos Router/emailAddress=support@tropos.com

74.45.228.160

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.2
subject=/C=US/ST=California/L=Sunnyvale/O=Tropos Networks/OU=Manufacturing/CN=Tropos Router/emailAddress=support@tropos.com

74.45.228.49

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.2
subject=/C=US/ST=California/L=Sunnyvale/O=Tropos Networks/OU=Manufacturing/CN=Tropos Router/emailAddress=support@tropos.com

74.45.228.86

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.2
subject=/C=US/ST=California/L=Sunnyvale/O=Tropos Networks/OU=Manufacturing/CN=Tropos Router/emailAddress=support@tropos.com

74.45.228.97

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.2
subject=/C=US/ST=California/L=Sunnyvale/O=Tropos Networks/OU=Manufacturing/CN=Tropos Router/emailAddress=support@tropos.com

74.45.229.217

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.2
subject=/C=US/ST=California/L=Sunnyvale/O=Tropos Networks/OU=Manufacturing/CN=Tropos Router/emailAddress=support@tropos.com

74.45.231.125

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.2
subject=/C=US/ST=California/L=Sunnyvale/O=Tropos Networks/OU=Manufacturing/CN=Tropos Router/emailAddress=support@tropos.com

74.45.231.136

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.2
subject=/C=US/ST=California/L=Sunnyvale/O=Tropos Networks/OU=Manufacturing/CN=Tropos Router/emailAddress=support@tropos.com

74.45.231.156

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.2
subject=/C=US/ST=California/L=Sunnyvale/O=Tropos Networks/OU=Manufacturing/CN=Tropos Router/emailAddress=support@tropos.com

78.188.162.184

SSH-2.0-ROSSSH

85.14.248.152

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_6.0p1 Debian-4+deb7u3

85.218.41.103

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.9
subject=/C=US/ST=California/L=Sunnyvale/O=Aerohive/OU=Default/CN=HiveAP

91.229.251.116

SSH-2.0-ROSSSH

94.141.150.121

SSH-2.0-ROSSSH

96.24.7.172

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.2

On the Matter of Brian Krebs.

The WWW of Brian Krebs, perhaps the second-most-worshiped1 patron saint to all English-speaking “computer security” charlatans — is sitting sadly offline today on account of a ~TB/sec DDOS flood.2

His titanic bandwidth, it turns out, was provided gratis by Akamai – spamatronicists par excellence and industrial-scale enablers of everything that makes the modern-day WWW a rancid sewer. Until it wasn’t. As soon Krebs began to cost them serious coin, he was dropped like a discarded candy wrapper.

And I’m expected, apparently, to see the misadventures of Krebs as a lamentable thing. But I do not — and am quite ready to explain why not to the patient and curious reader.

Krebs is renowned for his investigations of “cybercrime”, which in his eyes consists of Russian (for some… reason – almost exclusively Russian) spammers, malware artists, and “carders”.

Now, spam as we know it exists largely for two purposes: to mooch, by various means, from the great gas giants of advertising-crapolade, e.g., Google; and to spread malware. The latter exists mainly to facilitate “carding.” 3

And if we listen to Krebs and his ilk, we might believe that these problems are problems because there is a faraway country, full of evil untermenschen, who like nothing more than to steal the last penny from every honest American Joe, and to pollute his Precious Bodily Fluids. And who decided that the best way to do this is to write virii and send spam.

And Krebs would also have us believe that the pill against such headaches is to make a pompous WWW site, with many flow charts, containing some names of especially-uppity untermenschen who are then to be kidnapped by NATO gauleiters and shipped, bound and gagged, to American prisons..

Now apparently, if we listen to Krebs et al., writing virii is a “cybercrime” — but forcefeeding Microsoft’s sorry excuse for an operating system to the ~entire planet, for decades, somehow is not.

And stealing credit card numbers is a “cybercrime” — but forcing people to use a financial system where someone can drain your account by learning a constant string, printed in plain text4 on a piece of plastic in your pocket, somehow is not.

And guess what else – distributing amateur-hour “spyware” is a “cybercrime” — but artfully sabotaging open source software somehow is not. When you’re the NSA.

Because it is not about “crime”. It is about the hegemony of a particular set of crowned criminals whom Krebs shills for.

When I wrote to Krebs regarding the Mahmood Khadeer bombshell – the most recent and spectacular of a series of discoveries proving the existence, in the wild, of sabotaged PGP clients – there was no response.

Which, in retrospect, ought to have been no sort of surprise. Because the mass5 sabotage of RSA implementations was not a crime authored by any criminal Krebs is interested in prosecuting, but by his beloved masters. Who hung him out to dry today. “The world’s smallest violin plays.”


Edit:

The next day, Krebs was taken under the wing of Google’s “Project Shield”:

Project Shield welcomes applications from websites serving news, human rights, or elections monitoring content. We do not provide service to other types of content, including gaming, businesses, or individual blogs. See our User Content and Conduct Policy for more details.

Say hello to The Internet of the Future! Where USG shills are hosted on an “infrastructural”, one-way TV-style “Internet”, and everybody else gets to inhabit the remains of the old, DDOSable kind.


  1. After Schneier, of course. 
  2. The DDOS-enabling design of the Internet as we know it is no accident.
  3. “Carding” is a crime which happens at the pleasure of certain banks, who profit handsomely from it. This is not an especially well-kept secret. 
  4. Public-key cryptography has been around for quite a while. 
  5. We’ve found, one can surmise, only the tip of the Birthday Theorem iceberg thus far. 

A Complete Pill for the Sage SmartProbe.

The Sage SmartProbe was a very spiffy “Hard ICE” debugger, one of the few ever manufactured for use with modern (2010s) AMD x86-64 processors, and – as far as I’m aware – the only one ever sold on the mass market, rather than as part of “favourite son” deals (as, e.g., Intel’s, and Arium’s similar products were, and perhaps still are.)

Probe (right hand side) and "GizmoBoard" AMD G-series motherboard (left hand side.)

Quite a few of these things ended up bundled with various dev boards, saddled with time-limited demo expiration (yes, a time-limited hardware peripheral! don’t ask me…) The vendor perma-re-enabled an expired probe for a small fee.

Sage Eng. LLC, it appears, is long dead. Leaving no trace! How and why it died is unknown to me.

So now, instead of being unique tools in the development of, e.g., Coreboot, or whatever other attempts at sane utilization of x86-64 iron, the demo probes are stuck in limbo, working as so many peculiar paperweights.

This is a crying shame. Now you cannot unbrick the expired probes for any price. (At least not by buying the magic code from the original maker…)

So, without further delay, let us get one of these patients onto the operating table:

JTAG Test Points. (Click for full size.)

JTAG Test Points. (Click for full size.)

Now you could connect the thing to your favourite OpenOCD-compatible JTAG probe, and play around with the internals. E.g., this GDB script will give you an instruction trace. There are many interesting things to be learned, re: the command set (most of which is GDB-compatible, but there are a few interesting sharp edges.)


Or you could skip straight to the pill:

sage_pill.py
(SHA256: 2f9ce44fe069705a7ee83c0f4c733a6a0cc374613429c5c1f47a8481aa464b60)

sage_last_public_fw.tar.gz
(SHA256: 30c005febfbff531a2b9d06ef8c2c41fedb2c8993a2992a373fbeb66900fbaf8)

1) Download the pill and the fw image.
2) Check the SHA256 sums.
3) Unpack the firmware image.
4) Plug in the probe.
5) ./sage_pill.py sage_last_public_fw.bin /dev/ttyACM0

You may have ended up with some device other than ttyACM0 when you plugged it in. Find out which.
The script will need to run with sufficient privileges to talk to the “modem”.
It will ask for a final confirmation prior to firing.

6) Enjoy a 100% working x86-64 “Hard ICE”.


This article is continued here.

Tears of the Phucked.

Grumman Hellcat.

Grumman Hellcat.

Phuctor – rewritten and revved up on new hardware in April – is presently eating SSH RSA keys from a scan of the complete IPv4 space.

And, on occasion, breaking some.

And generating other laughs as well.  In today’s server logs:

134.223.116.158 - - [22/Jul/2016:15:54:57 +0000] "GET /gpgkey/50840391E5677882196999C9AE77F3177E6CBF8D35FB4F1FEF848CFADF9088B1 HTTP/1.1" 200 3425 "http://134.223.116.149:15871/cgi-bin/blockpage.cgi?ws-session=2010817170 "

What’s that? A ‘Websense’ censortron control panel, apparently.

Who might it belong to ? Could it be:

Isn’t it just a little bit too late for this nonsense? Plus, your monkemployees can still read the page when they clock out and go home. Or on their phones, in the toilets, etc.  Why bother with this nonsense ? Phuctor isn’t even a ‘wikileak’ or the like, it is merely one of the public whipping posts to which you have been tied, by your own hands, long ago.

Terraforming the “MyCloud Mini” : TTY.

“MyCloud Mini” is a ~$50, dual-core ARM, 256M RAM, 256M Flash, dual SATA box, in various respects similar to the famous PogoPlug.

Use a standard (e.g., CP1202) TTL converter. And you will get:

Stage-1 Bootloader    1  28 10:36:29 CST 2011
Attempting to set PLLA to 750MHz ...
  plla_ctrl0 : 0x0000000A
  plla_ctrl1 : 0x000F0000
  plla_ctrl2 : 0x001D01A0
  plla_ctrl3 : 0x00000017
PLLA Set
 
Setup memory, testing, Image 0
  Hdr len: 0x0001AC3C
  Hdr CRC: 0xB931AD17
 OK
 
U-Boot 1.1.2 (Oct 28 2011 - 10:44:29)
 
U-Boot code: 60D00000 -&gt; 60D1AC3C  BSS: -&gt; 60D1F2F4
RAM Configuration:
        Bank #0: 60000000 256 MB
SRAM Configuration:
        64KB at 0x50000000
NAND:256 MiB
*** Warning - bad CRC, using default environment
 
In:    serial
Out:   serial
Err:   serial
Setting Linux mem= boot arg value
Reading upgrade flag from NAND address 0x01ec0000 : 0
Hit any key to stop autoboot:  0
$
Posted in: Bitcoin, Cold Air, Hardware, NonLoper by Stanislav 2 Comments

Phuctor is Back!

Phuctor is back!

Now using Bernstein’s Algorithm (D. J. Bernstein. How to find smooth parts of integers.) The entire set is pairwise-GCD’d hourly.

Vectored Signatures, or the Elements of a Possible V-Algebra.

Once upon a time (in August of ‘15, to be exact) I wrote a very simple versionatron called ‘V‘.

Edit: See also Ben Vulpes’s excellent introduction to V.

V is a carefully-designed poison against the scurrying little vermin who feed on the proverbial ‘fear, uncertainty, and doubt.’

For readers who are not in the little circle of folks who regularly use the thing, I will outline the – very simple – idea: you diff two texts (source code trees, generic human-readables, or whatever cocktail of the two you happen to have) using a mildly-enhanced GNU Diff, sign the output with your PGP key, and publish it. After this is done, people in your WoT will be able to correctly (in logical order!) apply the patch(-es) – and perform a handful of other useful operations – at their leisure. 1

In exchange for a certain amount of headache – and a willingness to endure a bit of Spartan cruelty – V buys you version control with absolute cryptographic provenance of every delta, fully stateless operation (nothing you do will affect the output of a future operation unless you explicitly move files), a total extermination of the familiar “hidden file” shit-soup placed in directories by, e.g., GIT and SVN, and – most importantly – simplicity, via an absolute minimum of moving parts. V fits-in-head.2

Now this kind of thing is certainly not for everyone. But some thinking folks found it to have interesting implications; others – created some very spiffy applications; yet others – expertly re-implemented ‘V’, to the point where it is almost fit to be thought of as an actual tool.

Half a year later, the thing is in active use by perhaps a dozen people. The one worrisome thing is that most extant V-patches still carry only one known (or, at best, two/three) signatures – seals. Partly this is because people are lazyoverworked. But this is not the whole of it. There is also the fact that the act of producing a V-seal seems to have the connotation of wholesale acceptance, or endorsement, of the payload, and this is quite often The Wrong Thing. Not only are there times when one would like to seal a payload with a caveat of one kind or another, but presently we have no means of conveying disapproval – other than by refraining from sealing. The latter act conveys very little useful information, and no permanent sealed record remains of the effort taken to actually understand the patch. This is a Bad Thing.

One solution that has been floated is the inclusion of human-readable annotations with every seal. And this is well and good, and probably ought to happen, but perhaps it is possible to go a step further!

I would like to seal objects in a way which machine-readably conveys disapproval, doubtful provenance, doubtful veracity, and related attributes. And, naturally this has nowhere to go in classical PGP, and so what I propose here is, for the moment, a mere gedankenexperiment.

The root of the original problem is that a PGP signature per se conveys a scalar – precisely one bit of information: the existence of that signature. But what if it likewise carried a vector ? Can we meaningfully decompose it into orthogonal dimensions ? Let’s say, of four 2-bit components, vaguely inspired by the familiar Unix file access permission scheme:

Dimension 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Meaning
‘Hands’ 0 0 X X X X X X I did not create/modify any part. 3
0 1 X X X X X X I created/modified some part. 4
1 0 X X X X X X I created most, or modified the original beyond recognition. 5
1 1 X X X X X X I claim sole authorship.6
‘Eyes’ X X 0 0 X X X X I read none. Made no attempt to.7
X X 0 1 X X X X I read some part; and/or skimmed some or all.
X X 1 0 X X X X I read most of it.
X X 1 1 X X X X I read all.
‘Brain’ X X X X 0 0 X X I do not understand any.8
X X X X 0 1 X X I understand some, and/or poorly.
X X X X 1 0 X X I understand.
X X X X 1 1 X X I understand absolutely.9
‘Heart’10 X X X X X X 0 0 I distrust absolutely.11
X X X X X X 0 1 I distrust.
X X X X X X 1 0 I trust.12
X X X X X X 1 1 I trust absolutely.13

… adding up to precisely one byte of information conveying belief regarding the payload. This might seem like claptrap until you realize that this seal vector is able to usefully describe a wide variety of objects, of the kind one might seal:

0xCA A sample of output from a particular hardware RNG.
0×78 My dialogue with an NSA agent-provocateur.14
0×01 A One Time Pad found in the pocket of a dead enemy spy.
0×2A A copy of Macbeth.
0×38 A copy of the Donation of Constantine.
0×03 An encrypted message passing through my hands from one close friend to another.
0xDB Your own PGP key.
0×14 A copy of the MS Windows kernel.
0xFF An order to launch the nukes.
0×00 A copy of a suspected memetic bomb.

Listed in no particular order, and not necessarily of the V-tronic variety. Decoding is left as an exercise for the alert reader! To possibly be continued…


  1. Any instance of a V ‘repository’ (there is no distinction between a V ‘repository’ and a working set) consists solely of human-readable texts – in their preferred form for modification: the patches, the keys, and the seals, all of which together can be pressed (the V term for the instantiation operation) into a working copy of the tree, consisting solely of what has been certified by the people whose keys were invoked in the pressing. The dependency order of the patches is automatically respected.
  2. And not merely the source code of V itself – which, in the bulkiest of the extant implementations, weighs in somewhere south of a few hundred lines. The concept fits in one’s head, and can be readily explained in a restaurant over a napkin drawing within one cup of coffee.
  3. Or: “I had no part to play in the item’s having seen the light of day.”
  4. Or: “I had a part in causing the item to exist.”
  5. Or: “The item very certainly would not exist in anything like its present form without my doing.”
  6. Or: “No human hand but mine flipped, to my knowledge, so much as one bit therein.”
  7. Why would anybody sign something they haven’t read? There are many good reasons! E.g., to ascertain that the item existed in its present form when you first came across it, for instance.
  8. This is context-sensitive. The meaning of “understand” is beyond the scope of this article.
  9. Generally this category is to be reserved for items like simple arithmetical facts, or your own name, or any other object about the nature and mechanics of which you have no doubt whatsoever.
  10. This category contains no null. Which should surprise no one, considering that the very intent of a seal is to convey some aspect of trust (in the original, unvectorized pgp, this is a vague and extremely context-sensitive thing, here – a more explicit relationship.)
  11. “I am confident that the object, or the objects referred to therein, contain deliberate misrepresentations of reality, and may be dangerous to your health if perceived as fact, and to your honour – if relayed as factual.”
  12. “I have no cause to believe that a lie is told in the object or objects referred to therein.”
  13. “I trust the factual accuracy of the statement with my life and my honour.”
  14. This leads us into meta/reference problems – does the distrust concern the object itself (the veracity of my copy of the dialogue) or of the statements appearing therein? This is to be resolved by the reader. But would it perhaps make sense to specify this as a whole vector dimension of its own?